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Abstract
One of the recurring questions in designing dynamic control environments is whether providing more information leads 
to better operational decisions. The idea of having every piece of information is increasingly tempting (and in safety criti-
cal domains often mandatory) but has become a potential obstacle for designers and operators. The present research study 
examined this challenge of appropriate information design and usability within a railway control setting. A laboratory study 
was conducted to investigate the presentation of different levels of information (taken from data processing framework, 
Dadashi et al. in Ergonomics 57(3):387–402, 2014) and the association with, and potential prediction of, the performance of 
a human operator when completing a cognitively demanding problem-solving scenario within railways. Results indicated that 
presenting users only with information corresponding to their cognitive task, and in the absence of other, non task-relevant 
information, improves the performance of their problem-solving/alarm handling. Knowing the key features of interest to vari-
ous agents (machine or human) and using the data processing framework to guide the optimal level of information required 
by each of these agents could potentially lead to safer and more usable designs.
Keywords Human computer interaction · Decision support system · Usability engineering
1 Introduction
One of the recurring questions in designing dynamic control 
environments (from a simple mobile app to an advanced 
control setting) is whether providing more information leads 
to better operational decisions. The idea of having every 
piece of information available and potentially increasing the 
ability for operators to build up their ‘situation awareness’ 
(Endsley 1995) is so tempting (and in safety critical domains 
often mandatory) (N290.6-16 (2016) Requirements for mon-
itoring and display of nuclear power plant safety functions in 
the event of an accident) that it has become a real obstacle 
for designers and further will become a challenge for opera-
tors. This “getting lost in the trees and not seeing the woods” 
can potentially leads to fatal errors [e.g. Three Mile Island 
nuclear accident (Venda and Venda 1995)]; or at best it will 
cause operational inefficiencies (e.g. McLennan et al. 2006; 
Wu et al. 2016). The problem is to convince designers and 
system owners that there is no need to present every piece of 
information to the users and to provide clear tools and meth-
ods to enable the designers to select appropriate information 
to be presented. To achieve this, we propose a framework 
to guide the order and amount of information presentation.
One such setting where real-time situation awareness 
is maintained and informed by complex information dis-
plays is alarm handling in railway control rooms. With the 
introduction of centralised and integrated control systems, 
different members of staff with different roles are respon-
sible for broader and more complex problem-solving situ-
ations [i.e. multi-agent control shared between signalling, 
disruption management and track-worker protection func-
tions (Golightly et al. 2013)]. The challenges facing these 
operators are twofold: not only they are presented with 
huge amounts of information related to each function they 
perform; they also have to collaborate with other cognitive 
entities to complete each case of problem-solving. While 
these cognitive entities are primarily human, automation 
is increasingly playing a role in the management of traffic 
on the railways (Naghiyev et al. 2016) and in maintenance 
monitoring (Dadashi et al. 2014). While automation can in 
theory ease the workload of the operator, there is often a 
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need for the operator to perceive and interpret information 
regarding the actions of the automation (Balfe et al. 2012).
This paper aims to understand the effectiveness of a data 
presentation framework [i.e. D2I (Dadashi et al. 2014)] and 
to explore its impact on guiding operators and decision mak-
ers with relevant and sufficient information. Although the 
case study adopted in this paper is within a railway setting, 
the alarm-handling scenario has parallels with remote con-
dition monitoring, asset management and intelligent infra-
structure in other sectors. The move towards centralised and 
connected platforms (e.g. Internet of Things, Smart Cities, 
etc.) calls for a more in-depth and guided approach for data 
presentation, and the case reviewed and validated in the pre-
sent study has the potential to provide such platform.
2  Background
Alarms range from simple prompts for an operator to carry 
out further actions, through to semantically rich messages 
carrying verbal, textual or pictorial information about the 
source or cause of the abnormality. Successful implementa-
tion of alarm management systems, however, is not straight-
forward. Poor alarm handling has been a contributory factor 
in a number of safety–critical incidents such as the Three 
Mile Island incident in 1979 (Campbell 1988) and the Tex-
aco refinery explosion in 1994 (Wilkinson and Lucas 2001; 
Timms 2009). In transportation, aircraft hazard reports con-
firm that alarm problems contributed to about 50% of all 
of the incidents recorded between the years of 1984–1994 
(Gilson et al. 2001). Other examples include the Ladbroke 
Grove train accident (Cullen 2001) (though see Stanton and 
Baber 2008), for a different perspective) and the Channel 
Tunnel Fire (Kirkland 2002).
Major problems associated with alarm systems include 
alarm flooding, poor system state indication, poor priority 
management, nuisance and false alarms (Wilkinson and 
Lucas 2001; Gilson et al. 2001; Seagull and Sanderson 
2001). Research on alarm design suggests many instances 
where alarms are irrelevant or present unnecessary duplica-
tion of information (Omodei et al. 2005). Alarm problems 
are mainly rooted in some form of information complex-
ity and poor information design. Cummings and Mitchell 
(2006) listed the sources of complexity as:
• Volume of information,
• Ambiguous sources of information, and
• Unclear relationship between different information 
sources.
A significant effort has been devoted to exploring alarm 
design problems. Topics covered include alarm-handling 
response times (Stanton and Baber 2006), direction of 
attention (Gilson et  al. 2001; Woods 1995), modelling 
the operators’ diagnostic procedures (Stanton and Baber 
2008; Woods 1995), information load (Woods et al. 2002) 
and assessing how informative and meaningful alarms are 
(Seagull and Sanderson 2001).
Alarm management is one critical part of ensuring rail 
infrastructure is operational and running as intended. Alarms 
can cover issues with the infrastructure (e.g. signal failure, 
track failure, power failure), issues with underpinning con-
trol systems, security and fire alarms as well as weather-
related alarms (e.g. wind alarms, ice alarms). Weather-
related alarms are important, as they have direct impact on 
the performance of the train while on the move. Failing to 
address the alarm in a timely manner can put the train in an 
unsafe position (i.e. train speed limits need to be adjusted in 
order to ensure train stability during wind gusts).
Based on Stanton and Baber (2006), alarm handling con-
sists of four key activities: notification, acceptance, diag-
nosis and clearance. Applied to the railway infrastructure 
context, railway track workers, train drivers and, increas-
ingly, remote sensing of trackside assets and environment 
are responsible for identifying faults and informing control 
room operators (“notification”). Control room operators then 
assess the authenticity of the fault (“acceptance”) and con-
duct the early stages of diagnosis (“diagnosis”) in order to 
assist the operational railway (“clearance”). This informa-
tion would then be presented to the strategic analyst, who 
would recommend long-term solutions for the fault and ide-
ally to prevent them in the future (“clearance”).
This is particularly relevant to the future design of cen-
tralised and integrated ‘intelligent infrastructure’-type sys-
tems. In such systems, an increasing burden of the capture 
and processing of alarm-related data is taken on by automa-
tion. As the processing of asset-related data moves from data 
through to intelligence and decision-making on the part of 
technology (ISO13374), the operator at some point needs 
to interpret lower level automated analysis to understand 
the reasons for diagnosis and potential maintenance action 
required. Therefore, there can be something of a paradox 
whereby the automation is conducting some or all of the 
stages of alarm handling on behalf of the operator, but then 
it needs to generate information about that alarm handling 
for the operator to verify or to understand in order to inform 
maintenance action. The kind of information required will 
also vary by role—for example whether the user is charged 
with reacting to real-time infrastructure failures, or has more 
of a long-term strategic planning and renewals role. The 
question is that while designing the intelligent infrastructure 
user interface, what should be presented to each of these 
roles to ensure that they are presented with sufficient infor-
mation to fulfil their role and yet are not overloaded with too 
much. D2I led to categorisation of relevant information to 
three levels. These levels corresponded to the four stages of 
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alarm handling listed above and are assessed in the present 
study.
Figure 1 shows the Data to Intelligence (D2I) data-pro-
cessing framework and the hypothetical levels of information 
for alarm handling. The framework has three rows; each row 
corresponds to different cognitive activities that are required 
during problem-solving (alarm handling in this case). The 
assumption explored in the present paper is that by present-
ing the relevant level of information (as recommended by 
D2I), the performance of operators while conducting that 
cognitive task (e.g. alarm handling) will improve. For this 
paper, the particular focus is on reactive, real-time opera-
tional response to critical weather-related alarms.
There are parallels between the process of alarm han-
dling described in Dadashi et al. (2016) and a traditional 
information processing approach that underpins models such 
as the four-stage model of automation (Parasuraman et al. 
2000). In particular, notification supports information acqui-
sition, diagnosis supports decision selection, and clearance 
is a form of action implementation that has been selected, 
and automation or technological support for alarm han-
dling can be described within the Parasuraman et al. (2000) 
framework. Recent work (Patterson 2017) has put forward 
the view that different stages of information processing are 
underpinned by different cognitive systems—specifically 
that information acquisition and information analysis, the 
first two stages of the Parasuraman et al. (2000) model are 
underpinned by skill, pattern-matching, and largely heu-
ristic processes. The later stages of decision selection and 
action implementation are more effortful than rule and 
knowledge-based cognitive processes. Because they are 
underpinned by different mechanisms, these latter stages 
are more prone to different types of bias and error.
In order to verify the relationship between information 
type and alarm handling, a low-fidelity simulation-based 
experiment was conducted. The hypotheses explored here 
is that there is a relationship between the stages of problem-
solving and its corresponding level of information as sug-
gested in the D2I framework. As described above, each level 
on the D2I corresponds and supports a particular aspect of 
decision-making and alarm handling. Level 1 of D2I: Data 
and Information supports alarm notification and acceptance, 
level 2 of D2I: Knowledge supports alarm clearance and 
level 3: Intelligence supports proactive maintenance (i.e. 
predict and prevent). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume 
that when operators are presented with the relevant and suf-
ficient information (i.e. optimal information design), their 
performance when conducting each of these activities will 
be improved (i.e. enhanced usability). This performance can 
be quantified as both speed of response and accuracy, though 
there may also be a subjective sense of ease or confidence in 
being able to accurately handle the alarm.
3  Study approach
Episodes of weather-related alarms were simulated for the 
purpose of this study. Decision ladders (Rasmussen and 
Goodstein 1985) and in-depth exploratory (field studies, 
semi-structure Critical Decision Method-inspired interview 
Fig. 1  Hypothetical optimal level of information for alarm clearance (Dadashi et al. 2014)
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studies and observations) developed within an earlier study 
(Dadashi et al. 2010) led to an understanding of the activities 
associated with this particular type of alarm and informed 
the selection of tasks and scenarios. Exploring the infor-
mation that was utilised during alarm handling and corre-
sponding them to different aspects of the decision ladders 
led to understanding operators’ information requirements. 
This provided detailed understanding of the range of remote 
condition monitoring equipment available to railway opera-
tors and their societal challenges and potential opportunities. 
This informed the details associated with the experimental 
scenarios as well as the selection of the secondary task that 
was conducted as part of the experiment.
3.1  Experimental tasks
Two experimental tasks were selected for this study: 1—alarm 
acceptance and 2—alarm clearance. They were selected 
because they incorporated the other two activities that have 
been identified, i.e. noticing the alarm and diagnosing the 
alarm. One cannot accept an alarm without noticing it; simi-
larly, it is not possible to clear an alarm without diagnosing 
it. Also, both of these activities, i.e. accepting and clearing 
the alarm require the operator to interact with the experimen-
tal prototype and will provide a measure of performance. It 
should be noted that these tasks are simplified forms of the 
activities observed in real wind alarm handling episodes.
The task stages were as follows:
Task 1 accepting wind alarms: When an alarm is gener-
ated, operators have to check to see whether it is authentic 
or not (i.e. true failure or false alarm). This is referred 
to as alarm acceptance. When there is a wind alarm, an 
audible siren will be generated to inform the operator of 
the alarm. Participants had to check the wind gust shown 
on the alarm’s main window and compare it against 
the threshold table provided to them. If the wind gust 
speed presented on the main window was higher than the 
threshold, then the alarm was true and participants had 
to accept it. In order to accept an alarm, participants were 
instructed to press ‘1’ on the keyboard and, to cancel the 
alarm, they had to press ‘2’.
Task 2 clearing wind alarms: The second task was to cor-
rect the fault by imposing a speed restriction on the train 
in the alarmed location. The recommended speed restric-
tion varied depending on the type of trains; therefore, the 
participants had to identify the type of train and impose 
the specific speed restriction accordingly. Moreover, if 
participants were presented with information about ice 
alarms, they were advised to consider this in their clear-
ance task. If there were also problems with ice in the 
alarmed location, a new set of speed restrictions had to 
be recommended. Note that attending to ice alarm infor-
mation was optional for participants. This was due to the 
fact that ice alarm information provided additional con-
text that was not immediately necessary for either alarm 
notification or alarm clearance. By providing participants 
flexibility to choose, it was possible to explore whether 
participants opt in for additional pieces of information 
during alarm handling.
3.2  Levels of information
Three levels of information as recommended in the data 
processing framework (Dadashi et al. 2014) (Fig. 1) were 
examined in this experiment (Table 1). The first level of 
information includes rule-based collection of data and 
storing the measured data in a distributed database. In this 
scenario, level one information refers to basic information 
that is required to handle the alarm (e.g. data regarding 
location of the alarm and basic conditions). Level two 
information refers to information that is processed and 
can provide additional insights to the problem-solving 
Table 1  Levels of information
Level Task Information
One Alarm acceptance Location of the alarm
Wind gust speed
Threshold tables
One Alarm clearance Location of the alarm
Wind gust speed
Type of train
Speed restriction guidelines
Two Alarm acceptance Location of the alarm
Wind gust speed
Threshold tables
Wind alarms in other locations
Ice alarm information
Two Alarm clearance Location of the alarm
Wind gust speed
Type of train
Speed restriction guidelines
Ice alarm information
Three Alarm acceptance Wind gust speed
Threshold tables
Wind alarms in other locations
Ice alarm information
Wind gust speed in the neigh-
bouring weather station
Three Alarm clearance Location of the alarm
Wind gust speed
Type of train
Speed restriction guidelines
Ice alarm information
565Cognition, Technology & Work (2017) 19:561–570 
1 3
scenario (e.g. wind alarms in other locations), and finally, 
the third level of information provides knowledge towards 
making more optimised decisions and to be able to con-
duct proactive problem-solving (e.g. predict when an 
alarm will occur). In this scenario, the third level of 
information refers to the wind speed in the neighbouring 
location, and the operator can utilise this knowledge to 
predict whether there is an upcoming wind alarm in that 
location or not.
3.3  Experimental hypothesis
Experimental hypothesis: There is an effect (primary and 
secondary task performance) of the information provided 
(level 1–3) on the performance of alarm-handling tasks 
(alarm clearance and alarm acceptance). The independent 
variables explored are the alarm handling tasks (clearance 
or acceptance) and also the level of information provided 
(level 1–3). The dependent variables are the primary or 
secondary task performances that are measured under 
each of the experimental conditions. These include com-
pletion time, errors in primary tasks and errors in second-
ary tasks.
The alarm acceptance completion time is expected to 
increase from level 1 to level 3. The first level of infor-
mation provides the participants with only a basic under-
standing of the problem by giving tables of train speeds 
and train types. The second level of information provides 
the wind alarm status in the neighbouring weather sta-
tions to provide the participants with an overview of the 
domain and the third level of information provides infor-
mation regarding future potential wind alarms.
The increase in the completion time can simply relate 
to the increase in the amount of information presented 
to the participants. Moreover, information at levels 2 
and 3 is not necessarily useful for the alarm acceptance 
task. Although the second level of information can pro-
vide participants with an overview (e.g. status of wind 
alarm in the neighbouring weather stations) of their 
choice (‘accept’ or ‘cancel’), it is not a necessary piece 
of information.
Similarly, errors are also expected to increase from 
level 1 to level 2, but will decrease when participants are 
presented with the third level of information. The errors 
in the second level will increase possibly because opera-
tors become confused and their tasks do not really need 
an overview to aid their understanding. However, giving 
information to participants about future alarms means 
that, when those alarms occur, they are expecting them 
and therefore their errors may decrease.
4  Method
Thirty-one students (14 males and 17 females, with a mean 
age of 22 years) from the University of Nottingham partici-
pated in this study. None of the participants had any prior 
experience of alarm handling systems but were given related 
training and were assessed prior to the experiment. The 
study received approval from the University of Nottingham 
Faculty of Engineering Research Ethics Committee.
Participants were briefed and asked to review the infor-
mation sheet before agreeing to take part in the study. In all 
of the experimental trials participants had to perform task 
1 (alarm acceptance) prior to task 2 (alarm clearance) and 
they received training for each of the tasks. Participants were 
guided through a 7–10-min training session for task 1 and 
then performed a practice run with the experimental proto-
type. Next they were asked to attend to 24 cases of alarm 
episodes. After the completion of task 1, they were briefed 
and trained on task 2 for another 7–10 min. They then prac-
tised with the experimental prototype, after which they were 
asked to attend to 16 cases of alarms.
There was a 30-s interval between each of the alarm 
cases and participants were asked to monitor and find ‘point 
machine’ faults on the fault log and complete the fault log 
recording form (paper based). This was their secondary task 
and was used to infer the participants’ spare mental capac-
ity during the alarm handling (Sharples and Megaw 2015).
Finally, participants were asked to comment on the 
alarm episodes and to describe their reasons for the deci-
sions made. Their comments about the experimental proto-
type and the tasks were recorded using an audio recorder.
Three groups of participants (group A, group B and 
group C) were instructed to conduct both alarm acceptance 
and alarm clearance tasks. A between subject study was 
designed: each group of participants was presented with only 
one of the levels of information. Both tasks were examined 
and participants’ response times, and the number of errors 
they made while conducting the tasks was recorded.
A 15” Sony VAIO™ laptop was used for displaying 
the screenshots of the wind alarm prototype (Fig.  2). 
The experimental prototype is developed by E-prime 2.0 
™. E-prime 2.0 ™ is a software that is able to design 
an experimental study using drag and drop interfaces and 
simple scripting for the run of the experiment. Therefore, 
it is possible to define the sequence of activity live logging 
of participants’ responses and their completion times.
A 15” Dell™ laptop was used to display the mainte-
nance control fault log to participants when they were not 
handling alarms. A fault log recording form was com-
pleted by participants while monitoring the log. Finally, an 
Olympus™ audio recorder was used to record participants’ 
comments after the completion of the experiment.
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5  Results
Participants’ completion times and errors during the trials 
were recorded using E-prime 2.0™. A 2X3 between subject 
ANOVA test was conducted. The results have been analysed 
statistically using SPSS™ 18.0. Participants comments were 
reviewed and the main themes mentioned by participants 
were explored.
5.1  Completion time
For both alarm acceptance and clearance, a linear increase 
in response time was visible from level 1 to 3. Means of the 
response time associated with alarm acceptance and alarm 
clearance tasks while presented with three levels of informa-
tion are shown in Fig. 3 below. Despite the existence of this 
trend, for alarm acceptance, this increase was not statisti-
cally significant; F (2, 28) = 2.94, p > 0.05.
Multiple comparisons between different levels of infor-
mation show significant difference between completion 
times of alarm acceptance when presented with level 1 infor-
mation, compared with alarm clearance when presented with 
level 3 information (p < 0.05).
When participants were clearing the alarm the response 
time was significantly different depending on the level of 
information: F (2, 28) = 11.73, p < 0.001. It was the high-
est when participants were presented with level 3 infor-
mation and lowest when they were presented with level 1 
Fig. 2  Example of a simulated 
wind alarm window
Fig. 3  Mean of completion time for two tasks at three different levels 
(milliseconds). Level 1: Basic understanding of the problem that is 
absolutely necessary to solve the problem. Level 2: Information that 
assists participants to explain the issue in addition to the minimum 
information required. Level 3: Information that enables participants 
to predict the future status of the system in addition to the minimum 
information required
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information. Multiple comparison shows significant dif-
ference between all levels (p < 0.001).
5.2  Errors—primary task
The mean of the number of errors while performing both 
tasks and when participants were presented with the three 
levels of information is shown in Fig. 4. Even though the 
third level generates the fewest errors while accepting 
alarms (task 1), this was not statistically significant; F 
(2, 28) = 0.73, p > 0.05. Multiple comparisons of various 
levels also do not show any significant difference among 
various levels.
When participants were clearing alarms (task 2), 
depending on the level of information available to them, 
their errors were significantly different: F (2, 28) = 5.871, 
p < 0.05. Multiple comparisons between different levels 
of information show significant difference between levels 
1 and 2 (p < 0.05) and levels 2 and 3 (p < 0.01) (Fig. 5). 
5.3  Errors—secondary task
Secondary task performance refers to the percentage of 
faults logged correctly. There was no significant difference 
between secondary task performance in both alarm accept-
ance and alarm clearance tasks when presented with various 
levels of information.
When participants were presented with the first level of 
information, they found alarm clearance easier than alarm 
acceptance. One participant mentioned that task 2 (alarm 
clearance) was easier because I only had to look at one 
thing. In other words, the perceived difficulty was associated 
with the amount of information available, which explains 
the higher response time for alarm acceptance tasks in com-
parison with alarm clearance. Out of the 10 participants 
presented with the first level of information, only one par-
ticipant said that alarm acceptance was easier than alarm 
clearance and the reason mentioned was: the location of 
information was more organised on the screen than in task 
2. It must be noted that task 2 (i.e. alarm clearance) had the 
potential to explore additional information since participants 
could access various pieces of information about the location 
of the alarm as well as neighbouring weather conditions.
When presented with the second level of information, 
participants had the option of reviewing location informa-
tion and using this data for decision-making, if they wanted 
to. Although this was an optional piece of information, all 
10 participants in this condition considered it. One of the 
participants mentioned: well there is an option there and 
you just want to use it. Unlike the first group (level 1 infor-
mation), 7 of the 10 participants in the second group found 
alarm clearance more difficult. This was due to the increase 
in the amount of information that they felt obliged to review 
and analyse. This difficulty is reflected in the quantitative 
data as well: errors and response times are higher for the 
alarm clearance task than for the alarm acceptance task. The 
three participants who found task 2 easier under the second 
condition (i.e. second level of information) have different 
reasons. One participant said that the second task was easier 
because they were familiar with the system after performing 
alarm acceptance. Another participant made a mistake when 
accepting alarms due to distractions caused by monitoring 
the fault log and therefore found the task more difficult.
All 11 participants performing the tasks under the third 
condition attended to location information for the alarm 
clearance tasks but mostly ignored it when accepting alarms. 
One of the participants said that, during alarm acceptance, 
I got quite stressed and I could not attend to any additional 
information regarding the location, I just wanted to deal 
with the absolute minimum. However, five participants used 
the information regarding the gust speed in the neighbour-
ing location as a clue to predict future alarms. This explains 
the reason for the lower number of errors when performing 
Fig. 4  Errors made while alarm acceptance and alarm analysis in 
three conditions
Fig. 5  Percentage of faults logged correctly while conducting tasks 1 
and 2 in three conditions
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the alarm acceptance in the third condition (level 3) in com-
parison with the other two groups. Other participants chose 
not to refer to the wind speed in the neighbouring stations 
as they wanted to handle alarms as quickly as possible and 
therefore did not want to attend to information believed to 
be beneficial in the future. One of the participants mentioned 
that: I was not sure when these alarms would happen, so I 
thought by the time they are generated I might have forgot-
ten them already.
In the third group, only one participant used the route 
information to predict future alarms when clearing alarms; 
the rest chose not to use that information. One participant 
mentioned that, “I felt it was too much”, another said that 
because there were too many pieces of information I knew 
I would not remember that route anyway, so it was better to 
deal with them when they were generated.
In the third group, 7 out of 11 participants found the 
alarm acceptance task easier than the alarm clearance task. 
One participant thought that alarm acceptance was more dif-
ficult because, in alarm clearance, the user felt more engaged 
and felt that they had control over the situation. The partici-
pant said: Task 1 (alarm acceptance) is too boring for the 
operator and should be done by a machine, not a human. 
A number of participants reported confusion when they 
had to deal with various pieces of information when clear-
ing alarms and admitted that they might have made some 
mistakes.
6  Discussion
The study presented in this paper attempts to merge two 
challenging aspects of design that are relevancy and suf-
ficiency of information. The D2I framework has parallels 
with theoretical foundations that were explored in Vicente 
and Rasmussen (1992). Skill, Rule Knowledge (SRK) tax-
onomy offers three distinct levels of information processing 
and offers different information presentation formats sup-
porting each of these levels (S/R/K). D2I framework does 
not offer a way of categorising user behaviour, it aims to 
explore the overall system. This holistic understanding can 
further be decomposed into systems of systems and further 
explained with Ecological Interface Design (EDI) frame-
work or SRK taxonomy.
The results have partially confirmed the hypotheses of 
the study. The results for alarm clearance, incorporating 
the later stages of alarm processing (Stanton and Baber 
2006; Dadashi et al. 2016), broadly follow the hypotheses. 
More information leads to slower response time, and more 
errors when presented with Level 3 information (predictive 
information). This pattern is not, however, replicated for 
alarm acceptance. There are no significant differences in 
either response time, or for error rate, as a result of pre-
senting different levels of information.
In terms of alarm handling models such as Stanton and 
Baber (2006), these results suggest that the impact of addi-
tional information is more profound at the later stages of 
alarm handling than at earlier stages. Again, this has par-
allels with the theoretical framework that later stages of 
information processing are more dependent on effortful, 
conscious problem-solving and decision-making (Patter-
son 2017), and are more prone to being slowed or misdi-
rected by spurious information, even if that information is 
potentially predictive in supporting future alarm handling 
episodes (Level 3; Dadashi et al. 2014). The stages of 
alarm handling that are more likely to be skilled, percep-
tual and pattern-matching are less prone to the effects of 
information overload and spurious information (Patterson 
2017).
This study was limited due to the use of trained, nov-
ice participants rather than operational experts. It must 
be noted that the novice participants who conducted the 
study were trained and evaluated to ensure that they were 
familiar with the tasks. While the actual standard of per-
formance must be different for operators, the differentia-
tion between the independent variables is anticipated to be 
consistent, though this requires further validation. In-line 
with Gray (2002) the experimental setting that was set up 
for this study was tractable (i.e. easily managed, taught or 
controlled), corresponded to the tasks explored and were 
engaging (i.e. participants were not bored and thus pro-
vided continuous feedback). The simulated environment 
was not identical to an industry system, but provided a 
comparative level of authenticity, based on familiarisa-
tion visits, while supporting the control the level of task 
complexity. As it is noted in Balfe et al. (2018), the use 
of a simulator provided the opportunity to rehearse and 
replicate the operational activities. These activities may 
often be too intertwined and hard to observe within the 
real-life work setting. Nonetheless, future studies should 
be conducted with more sensitive simulators to facilitate 
assessing the cognitive processing of railway experts, one 
example being to develop synthetic environment or micro-
worlds as suggested by Gonzalez et al. (2005) to explore 
dynamic decision-making. Moreover, assessing the frame-
work within other types of control systems (e.g. manufac-
turing, energy, process control, etc.) will develop insights 
on temporal aspects of information presentation. This is 
particularly the case when one role is responsible for dif-
ferent levels of decision-making. The other limitation of 
this study which explains the lack of significant difference 
can be due to the number of participants. Although this 
number was suggested through a power analysis, the effect 
size was estimated to be medium.
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7  Conclusions
The present study simulated the application of the data 
processing framework in guiding the design of a cognitive 
system. This framework can be utilised in similar contexts 
in order to assist designers and developers with creating 
more effective end products. When designing large scale 
complex multi-agent control systems, D2I framework can 
be used to inform relevant human factors techniques that 
should be conducted by designers to ensure that appro-
priate level of understanding of the context is available 
for an effective design (For more information regarding 
the application and utilisation of D2I framework please 
see Dadashi et al. 2014). In particular, the guidance to 
be taken from this study, subject to further validation, is 
that additional information will have more impact at the 
later stages of decision-making and action selection (clear-
ance) of alarms. Earlier stages of identifying alarms will 
be more robust in the face of additional information, but 
we should not assume they are completely robust. The 
wealth of historical evidence into alarm flooding suggests 
that there will be a point where new alarms are lost in the 
sheer volume of demands placed on the operator. Accord-
ingly, the trends shown for task 1 (alarm acceptance) for 
both response rate and error indicate that with a more com-
plex domain or with a higher number of synchronous task, 
performance on this early stage of alarm handling would 
also be prone to degradation, but possibly not at the same 
rate as clearance. These results also suggest that the kind 
of predictive information that new forms of maintenance 
and asset monitoring technology will generate (Dadashi 
et al. 2016) will form an additional load if not carefully 
managed within user centred design.
These findings from this study highlight the need for 
robust methods that allow the impact of display content on 
decisions to be analysed in order to anticipate situations 
where ‘too much’ information is presented. Approaches 
such as Ecological Interface Design (Vicente and Ras-
mussen 1992; Houghton and Patel 2015), Cognitive 
Work Analysis (Dadashi et al. 2013) and Cognitive Task 
Analysis (Morison and Woods 2016) point the way for-
ward. However, it is important to understand that for such 
a method to be effective, all likely tasks would need to 
be known. This is to ensure that an appropriate level of 
contextual understanding is developed and hence relevant 
level of information processing is supported. It must be 
noted that an overall understanding of tasks will deter-
mine the level of detail that is required for data collec-
tion and task analysis. Therefore, it is recommended that 
alongside such a task-driven approach, participatory meth-
ods are used with subject matter experts to understand 
the unintended consequences that would occur if data are 
removed from a display. A methodology that simply asks 
‘what if this piece of information is removed?’ has the 
potential to be very powerful to test the implications of 
display simplification.
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